Trade Credit as Collateral by Massimo Omiccioli
Temi di discussione
del Servizio Studi
Trade credit as collateral
Number 553 - June 2005
by Massimo OmiccioliThe purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board: G IORGIO G OBBI, MARCELLO B OFONDI, MICHELE C AIVANO, ANDREA L AMORGESE, 
FRANCESCO PATERNÒ, MARCELLO PERICOLI, ALESSANDRO SECCHI, FABRIZIO VENDITTI, STEFANIA ZOTTERI.
Editorial Assistants: ROBERTO MARANO, CRISTIANA RAMPAZZI.TRADE CREDIT AS COLLATERAL
by Massimo Omiccioli∗
Abstract
A remarkable feature of short-term business ﬁnance is the widespread use of trade credit
as collateral in bank borrowing, especially by small and medium-sized ﬁrms. The paper
models the incentives for a ﬁrm to collateralize accounts receivable as a trade-off between
the beneﬁt from lower interest rates and the implicit cost arising from the disclosure of
private information associated with this form of collateral. The model shows that the share
of receivables pledged as collateral is larger: i) when the borrowing ﬁrm is riskier (and
the difference in interest rates between secured and unsecured lending is larger); ii) when
information disclosure costs for the ﬁrm are lower (e.g. when the information is dispersed
among many banks and ﬁrm’s assets are mostly made up of tangibles); iii) when the default
correlation between sellers and buyers is lower; iv) when the legal protection of creditors is
weaker (and suppliers have a greater advantage over banks in monitoring and enforcing loan
contracts). These predictions are supported by empirical evidence from a sample of 7,250
Italian ﬁrms.
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∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department1. Introduction1
A large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, has analyzed the provision of
collateral asakeyfeatureindebtcontracting.2 Inthiscontextlittleattentionhasbeengiventoa
special type of secured debt contract, which involves pledging accounts receivable as collateral
for bank borrowing. Yet this form of collateralization accounts for a large share of bank loans
to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. In the United States lines of credit secured by short-term assets, such
as receivables or inventories, accounted for approximately 23 per cent of the total amount of
commercial and industrial loans at commercial banks in 1998 (Klapper, 2001). In Italy loans
secured by accounts receivable represented, at the end of 2002, 22 per cent of total bank loans
to non-ﬁnancial companies and 54 per cent of the amount extended under short-term lines of
credit.
Despite its widespread use, the collateralization of accounts receivable is far from being
homogeneous across ﬁrms. It usually plays a more important role for smaller and riskier ﬁrms,
while larger and more creditworthy companies often choose different policies to manage and
ﬁnance their accounts receivable.3 Why does the extent of collateralization vary across ﬁrms?
If ﬁrms can take advantage of lower interest rates on loans secured by accounts receivable,
what are the costs that can counterbalance this beneﬁt? This paper argues that the information
disclosure arising from the use of trade credit as collateral may represent, from the ﬁrms’
perspective, the other side of the ﬁnancial advantage. Therefore the ﬁrm’s choice is modelled
as a trade-off between borrowing costs and disclosure costs. Riskier ﬁrms have a stronger
incentive to pledge receivables as collateral because the difference in interest rates between
secured and unsecured lending increases with theprobability ofdefault of the borrower. On the
other hand, ﬁrms that are more exposed to the costs arising from the disclosure of information
will have a stronger incentive to choose different policies to manage and ﬁnance their accounts
receivable. Theoretical predictions are tested on a large sample of Italian ﬁrms.
1 I would like to thank Giorgio Albareto, Luigi Cannari, Amanda Carmignani, Guido de Blasio, Federico
Signorini and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions; all remaining errors are my own.
Address for correspondence: Via Nazionale, 91 - 00184 Rome, Italy. Email: massimo.omiccioli@bancaditalia.it.
Tel.: +3906-4792-2855.
2 For a recent survey, see Coco (2000).
3 Mian and Smith (1992), for example, ﬁnd that the larger, more creditworthy ﬁrms establish captive ﬁnance
subsidiaries, while the smaller, riskier ﬁrms issue accounts-receivable secured debt.8
While the existing literature has already recognized that a bank may learn valuable
information about a borrowing ﬁrm and its customers from having accounts receivable as
collateral,4 the costs perceived by ﬁrms as a result of the disclosure of such information have
generally been overlooked.5 Two mechanisms can give rise to information disclosure costs
for ﬁrms. First, if the information on the borrower leaks out to competitors, this can lower
the expected returns from product market operations (Yosha, 1995; Bhattacharya and Chiesa,
1995; Ruckes and von Rheinbaben, 2004). Second, the borrower and his customers may ﬁnd it
convenient toretainsome degreeof ﬂexibilityintheir debt contract andsomedegree of opacity
towards the bank itself. When receivables are collateralized and the customer cannot pay the
trade debt on time, the debt contract between the buyer and the supplier cannot be informally
renegotiated and the information that the invoice has not been paid will damage the reputation
of both. As a consequence, pledging receivables as collateral entails a loss of ﬂexibility, which
is one of the greatest advantages of trade credit.6
I formalize this interpretation by presenting a simple model that describes how much
trade credit the ﬁrm is willing to pledge as collateral for bank borrowing as the outcome of
two opposite forces: the lower interest rates on credit lines secured by accounts receivable
and the information disclosure costs associated with this form of collateral. The buyer needs
credit in order to buy inputs from the seller and can be ﬁnanced either by the bank or by the
seller. In the latter case, the seller reﬁnances the credit through the bank, either using accounts
receivable as collateral (secured lending) or not (unsecured lending). Both banks and suppliers
observe customer default probabilities, are riskneutral and price loans at their expected payoff.
The supplier has an advantage over the bank in investigating the creditworthiness of the buyer,
as well as in monitoring and enforcing repayment of the credit. Moreover, since pledging
receivables as collateral prevents buyers and sellers from renegotiating their debt contracts,
thisfurtherreducesthe buyer’s exanteprobabilityof default ontradedebt. Perfect competition
in product and credit markets is assumed.
4 See, for examp le, B iai s and Gollier ( 1997), Boot (2000), and especially Mes ter, Nakamura and Renault
(2002).
5 Information disclosure costs have been widely discussed in other ﬁelds of corporate ﬁnance: see, for
example, Boot and Thakor (2001).
6 This can be viewed as an application of the idea put forward by Boot and Thakor (2003) on the potential
loss of ﬂexibility associated with pledging an asset as collateral.9
The model offers a rich set of predictions, which are supported by the empirical evidence
on the use of trade credit as collateral in a sample of 7,250 Italian ﬁrms.7 The share of accounts
receivable pledged as collateral is larger: i) when borrowing ﬁrms are riskier; ii) when they are
smaller and younger and do not belong to corporate groups; iii) when they are less exposed to
the costs associated with information disclosure (i.e. when they have a larger number of bank
relationships and their assets mostly consist of tangibles); iv) when their customers are more
creditworthy; v) when risk correlation between sellers and customers is lower; vi) when there
is less legal protection for creditors (and trade creditors have a larger advantage over bank
lenders).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the costs and beneﬁts
of using trade credit as collateral and reviews the related literature on the subject. Section
3 presents the formal model, while section 4 empirically tests its predictions. Section 5
concludes.
2. Costs and beneﬁts of using trade credit as collateral
The standard literature on secured lending is mainly concerned with ‘outside’ collateral
and cannot be easily applied to the analysis of the collateralization of accounts receivable,
which represent the most typical form of ‘inside’ collateral.8 Unlike ﬁxed assets, whose
liquidation value does not depend on the cash ﬂow derived from a ﬁrm’s normal business,
the value of trade credit depends on the ability of the ﬁrm to collect its accounts receivable
and on the capacity of its customers to repay their debts. Furthermore, as Berger and Udell
(1995) point out, the decision to pledge accounts receivable ‘may have different motivations
than pledging other collateral’.9 From the seller’s perspective, the main purpose of trade credit
is to provide a guarantee of product quality (Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long, Malitz and Ravid,
1993) or more generally to build customer relationships (Smith, 1987; Summers and Wilson,
7 Compared with the only two other empirical studies on the subject (Berger and Udell, 1995; Klapper,
2001), in this paper I can exploit: a) a much larger and more diversiﬁed sample of ﬁrms; b) a unique bank-ﬁrm
matched dataset containing individual information on loans and interest rates by borrower and lending bank, as
well as balance sheet information on borrowing ﬁrms (including a measure of ﬁrms’ default risk).
8 Assets which are used in the project to be ﬁnanced represent ‘inside’ collateral, while assets which are
not used in the project represent ‘outside’ collateral. A more general distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’
collateral hinges on the correlation between the value of the collateralized assets and the cash ﬂow derived from
the ﬁrm’s normal business (outside collateral having a low correlation and inside collateral a high correlation).
9 For an overview of accounts receivable management policies, see Mian and Smith (1992).10
2001).10 As a result, be ing able t o extend tr ade cr edit a t competitive c onditions is an essentia l
tool for competition i n t he product ma rket. The decision of a ﬁ rm to post acc ount s rece ivabl e
as collateral can be seen as a way to lower funding costs in order to be able to offer trade credit
at competitive terms.
Thelowerborrowingcostonloanssecuredby accounts receivablestemsessentially from
the principle of risk diversiﬁcation (Frank and Maksimovic, 1998; Klapper, 2001; Burkart and
Ellingsen, 2004). The ba nk will not be repaid only if both t he buye r and the supplie r de fault
on their obligations. As in standard portfolio analysis, when the probabilities of default are
not perfectly correlated, diversiﬁcation lowers total portfolio risk. Most of the earlier literature
on the ﬁnancial explanations for trade credit (Schwartz, 1974; Emery, 1984; Duca, 1986)
disregards the use of trade credit as collateral in bank borrowing. As a result, in these models,
where suppliers have an advantage over banks in screening their clients and in monitoring
and enforcing loan contracts, trade credit only ﬂows from larger or more creditworthy ﬁrms
to those that are in some way riskier or credit-constrained. On the contrary, when accounts
receivable can be collateralized, it is not necessarily true that trade credit can only be extended
by ﬁrms with an easier access to capital markets.
As Boot and Thakor (2003) point out, it is somewhat puzzling that unsecured loans are
observed despite the obvious beneﬁt of a lower borrowing cost with a secured loan: ‘what
exactly is the cost the borrower perceives in pledging an asset as collateral?’ The collection
of accounts receivable provides the bank with exclusive access to a continuous stream of
information about the borrowing ﬁrm and its customers (Mester, Nakamura and Renault,
2002). This gives the bank an information advantage, but it can represent a cost for the
borrowing ﬁrm and for its customers. This is evident if we imagine that all sales are made
on credit and all accounts receivable are pledged as collateral to only one bank. In this case the
bank will know each and every customer of the borrowing ﬁrm, their relative shares in ﬁrm’s
total sales, the length of payment delays granted to each customer, whether the customer pays
ontimeornotorisinsolvent. AsinYosha(1995), BhattacharyaandChiesa(1995), Ruckesand
vonRheinbaben (2004), ifsuchinformation is disseminated through voluntary orunintentional
10 Price discrimination may represent another motive for trade credit (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner,
1988), but it seems to have limited empirical relevance (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999; Summers and Wilson, 2002;
Cannari, Chiri and Omiccioli, 2004).11
leaks to third parties (such as competitors and suppliers), this can be highly detrimental to the
borrower as well as to the customers.
The borrower can reduce information disclosure costs by limiting the total amount of
information which is disclosed (the share of accounts receivable pledged as collateral), but this
comes at the cost of higher interest rates. As an alternative, the borrower can achieve the same
goal by dispersing a given amount ofinformation among a plurality of banks. This represents a
sharp difference between standard lending and lending secured by accounts receivable. In the
ﬁrst case, when theborrowing ﬁrmisrequiredtorelease conﬁdential information to the lenders
in order to demonstrate its creditworthiness, increasing the number of creditors enhances the
probability of an information leak because the same amount of information is revealed to a
plurality of lenders. By contrast, in the second case each bank has access only to a limited
amount of information and cannot exploit the complementary effect of the different pieces of
information.11
There is an additional reason, closer in spirit to the analysis by Boot and Thakor
(2003), why information disclosure can represent a cost for the borrowing ﬁrm and for its
customers. Boot and Thakor (2003) suggest that pledging an asset as collateral entails a
loss of ﬂexibility, which may represent the other side of its ﬁnancial advantage. Trade credit
is usually a highly ﬂexible form of credit, which relies mostly on informal mechanisms of
enforcement, based on ‘reputation’ and long-term relationships and often without any written
contract. For example, suppliers are often willing to accept late payments without charging
interest, or to allow customers to take unearned cash discounts,12 especially when they have a
long-standing relationship (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999; Summers and Wilson, 2002; Cannari,
Chiri and Omiccioli, 2004). Besides being an obvious advantage for the buyer, this ﬂexibility
c a na l s ob e n e ﬁt the supplier, when he has an interest in relaxing ex post trade credit terms,
for example in order to help customers overcome a temporary ﬁnancial difﬁculty, thereby
protecting his long-term investment. In this case suppliers can be seen as liquidity insurance
providers (Cuñat, 2002). Pledging accounts receivable as collateral involves waiving this form
of ﬂexibility. Since it is the bank (and not the seller) which collects the receivables, sellers
and buyers are prevented from informally renegotiating their contracts. Moreover, when
11 On the subject, see Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2002).
12 The buyer takes the discount for prompt payment, but does not pay within the discount period.12
the customer cannot pay his trade debts on time, this information will directly damage his
reputation and indirectly also the reputation of his supplier. As an extreme case of relationship
lending, trade credit can be particularly exposed to the soft-budget-constraint problem. In
some cases the seller may ﬁnd it convenient to relinquish the ﬂexibility of trade credit and the
possibilities of renegotiation, for example when he wants to make it more costly for the buyer
to delay payment or to default. Pledging accounts receivable as collateral, in this case, can be
seen as a tool to discipline the buyer’s behaviour and should result in a lower probability of
default or late payment.
3. The model
In this section I model the incentives for a ﬁrm to collateralize its accounts receivable as
a trade-off between lower interest rates and information disclosure costs arising from the use
of trade credit as collateral. I build mostly on the models of Frank and Maksimovic (1998),
Klapper (2001) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). The main novelty consists in incorporating
information disclosure costs in the model.
The model considers three types of agents: sellers, buyers and banks. The buyer needs
credit in order to buy inputs from the seller and can be ﬁnanced either by the bank or by
the seller. In the latter case, the seller reﬁnances the credit through the bank, either using
his accounts receivable as collateral (secured lending) or not (unsecured lending). Perfect
competition in product and credit markets is assumed.
The seller has an advantage over the bank in investigating the creditworthiness of the
buyer, as well as in monitoring and enforcing repayment of the credit (Petersen and Rajan,
1997). One of the reasons may be the in-kind nature of trade credit, given that inputs are
less easily diverted than cash and hence less subject to moral hazard (Burkart and Ellingsen,
2004). As a result, the buyer’s probability of default is not independent from the subject that
is granting the credit: it is lower in the case of trade credit than in that of bank credit.
The probability of default on bank debt is ρS for the seller and ρB f o rt h eb u y e r( w i t h
0 < ρi < 1. In the case of trade credit, on the other hand, the probability of default of the
buyer is equal to ρB(1 − τ),w h e r eτ measures the ﬁnancing advantage of the seller over the
bank (with 0 < τ < 1). Moreover, if the seller pledges his accounts receivable as collateral
for bank borrowing, this further reduces the probability of default of the buyer, given that13
a double monitoring mechanism is in operation (directly by the trade creditor and indirectly
by the bank). In this case the probability of the buyer defaulting on his trade debt is equal to
ρB(1−τ−γ),w h e r eγ measures the advantage of the double monitoring (with 0 < γ < 1−τ).
The risk-free interest rate is R and all parties are risk neutral. As a result both the bank
and the supplier price loans at their expected payoff. The borrower promises to repay (1 + R)
at time t1 and in return the bank lends L at time t0. If the buyer or the seller is directly funded
b yt h eb a n ko na nu n s e c u r e db a s i s ,Lu







where i =( B,S) and the superscript u indicates that the bank loan is unsecured.
When the buyer is ﬁnanced by the seller, who in turn reﬁnances the credit through
secured bank lending, the bank will not be repaid only if both the seller and the buyer
are insolvent. The amount of secured bank lending extended to the seller (Ls
S) is equal to
1−ρSρB(1−τ −γ)−σSB,w h e r eσSB is the covariance between the default of the buyer (on
trade debt) and the default of the seller (on bank debt) and has the following upper limit:13
σSB ≤ min[ρS;ρB (1 − τ − γ)] − ρSρB (1 − τ − γ). (2)





1 − ρSρB(1 − τ − γ) − σSB
− 1. (3)
From (1), (2) and (3) it is possible to derive the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1. Interest rates on bank borrowing secured by accounts receivable are
always lower than interest rates on unsecured lending as long as the covariance in insolvency
between the buyer (on collateralized trade debt) and the seller (on unsecured bank debt) is not
perfect.14 The difference in interest rates between unsecured and secured lending increases as
13 If the two events are DS and DB,w eh a v e :σSB =P r ( DS ∩ DB) − Pr(DS)Pr(DB),w h e r ePr(DS ∩
DB) ≤ min[Pr(DS);Pr(DB)]. It is worth noting that the importance of the default correlation between sellers
and buyers stems from the very nature of trade credit as inside collateral.
14 Suppose the supplier is insolvent every time the buyer does not pay his trade debt. In this case the joint
probability of default will be equal to the lowest between the buyer’s probability of default (on trade debt) and the14
the probability of default of the borrower rises.15
If the seller funds his trade credit via unsecured borrowing, the interest rate he must





(1 − ρS)[1− ρB (1 − τ)]
− 1 (4)
On the other hand, if the seller funds his trade credit via secured borrowing, the interest rate





[1 − ρSρB(1 − τ − γ) − σSB][1− ρB (1 − τ − γ)]
− 1. (5)
If the buyer is indifferent between using trade credit or bank credit, the interest rate on
trade credit must be equal to or lower than the interest rate the buyer would pay on unsecured
bank credit. From equations (1), (4) and (5) it is possible to derive the following proposition
(see the Appendix for the proof):
PROPOSITION 2. When unsecured bank borrowing is used to ﬁnance accounts receivable,
for trade credit to be viable the seller must have a lower probability of default than the buyer.16
Onthe contrary, byusingreceivables as collateral, evenriskier ﬁrms maybe abletooffertrade
credit, at competitive terms, to more creditworthy ﬁrms.17
The interest rate on trade credit cannot be higher than the interest rate the buyer would
pay on unsecured bank debt, but it must be higher than the cost of funding trade credit in order
to compensate for the probability that the buyer could default. But when the seller and the
buyer have the same probability of default, they both pay the same interest rate on unsecured
bank debt. As a consequence, trade credit cannot be offered at competitive terms when it is
seller’s probability of default (on bank debt). When the buyer’s probability is the lowest, the joint probability will
be lower than the seller’s probability of default. When the seller’s probability is the lowest, the joint probability
will be equal to the seller’s probability of default.
15 When the seller’s probability of default (on bank debt) increases, the joint probability of default increases
bya proportionequaltothebuyer’sprobabilityofdefault (ontradecredit), whichislowerthanunitybydeﬁnition.
16 This is the case described by Schwartz (1974), in which trade credit only ﬂows from ﬁrms that pay low
interest rates to ﬁrms that pay higher interest rates.
17 This is the case described by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), in which ‘ﬁrms simultaneously give and take
trade credit because receivables can be collateralized’.15
funded by unsecured bank borrowing. This may be possible only when trade credit is ﬁnanced
by pledging accounts receivable as collateral because in this case the borrowing cost is lower
than the interest rate both the seller and the buyer pay on unsecured bank debt.
The discussion above shows that interest rates on loans secured by accounts receivable
are always lower than interest rates on unsecured loans, if we rule out the hypothesis of perfect
correlation in insolvency between sellers and buyers. If this is the case, trade credit should
always be ﬁnanced by secured borrowing. Even if riskier ﬁrms have a stronger incentive
to pledge trade credit as collateral, nevertheless this incentive should also work for more
creditworthy ﬁrms. In the rest of this section I model how information disclosure costs can
counterbalance the ﬁnancial advantage of pledging trade credit as collateral.
When the seller extensively uses accounts receivable as collateral, the bank is given
access to a continuous stream of information about the borrower’s commercial and ﬁnancial
developments. This disclosure of information can impose a cost both on the seller and on
his customers. It is reasonable to expect that both sellers and buyers will trade off these
information disclosure costs against the advantage of lower interest rates.
As far as the seller is concerned, his commercial and ﬁnancial conditions will be most
transparent when he has an exclusive banking relationship with thelender and when hepledges
all his accounts receivable as collateral. Disclosure costs will be lower when the share of trade
credit pledged as collateral (α) is smaller and when the number of bank relations is larger. For
simplicity, we can write disclosure costs for the seller as a linear relation: dcS = ϑα,w h e r e
ϑ is an inverse function, inter alia, of the number of bank lenders. For the buyer, on the other
hand, the existence of disclosure costs creates a wedge between the interest rates he is willing
to pay: i) when the seller uses trade credit as collateral; ii) when the seller does not use trade
credit as collateral. We can suppose that in the ﬁrst case the buyer is not willing to pay more
than the interest rate he would pay by borrowing directly from the bank (ru
B), while in the
latter case he may be willing to pay something more (ru
B + κ) in order to avoid disclosing
i n f o r m a t i o nt ot h eb a n ka n dt or e t a i nt h eﬂexibility of trade credit.18
18 In line with Cuñat (2002), it is possible to interpret κ as a liquidity insurance premium. Results do not




B − κ). In this case κ should be interpreted as strictly measuring
information disclosure costs for the buyer.16
For a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm, the problem can be stated as follows:
max
α
ΠTC subject to rTC ≤ αr
u
B +( 1− α)(r
u
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By imposing P = C =1(perfect competition in the product market) and rTC =
αru
B +( 1− α)(ru
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α =0 if α∗ ≤ 0
α = α∗ if 0 < α∗ ≤ 1
(10)
with ∂α∗/∂ρS > 0, ∂α∗/∂ϑ < 0, ∂α∗/∂κ < 0, ∂α∗/∂σSB < 0, ∂α∗/∂γ > 0 and
∂α∗/∂R>0, while the sign of the derivatives with respect to τ and ρB is not deﬁned and
depends on the relative value of disclosure costs (see Appendix for details). However, ∂α∗/∂τ
will tend to be higher (more positive)for riskier sellers, whilethe opposite is true for ∂α∗/∂ρB.
PROPOSITION 3. (i) Riskier ﬁrms make more use of trade credit as collateral. (ii)
When disclosure costs (for sellers and buyers) are higher, the share of trade credit pledged
as collateral is smaller. (iii) When the correlation in insolvency between sellers and buyers
is higher, the share of trade credit pledged as collateral is smaller. (iv) The greater the effect
of using trade credit as collateral in reducing the probability of default of buyers, the larger
the share of trade credit pledged as collateral. (v) When (risk-free) interest rates are higher,
ﬁrms make more use of trade credit as collateral. (vi) The effect of the enforcement advantage17
of suppliers over banks on the share of trade credit pledged as collateral will tend to become
(more) positive for riskier ﬁrms. (vii) The effect of a higher insolvency risk of customers on
the share of trade credit pledged as collateral will tend to become (more) negative for riskier
sellers.
To capture the economic intuition behind these effects we should simply observe that the
relative advantage of secured versus unsecured loans can be affected in two different ways: i)
by reducing the costs of ﬁnancing trade credit; ii) by increasing the expected return on sales
made on credit. The results for ρS, ϑ, σSB, κ and γ are straightforward. Since the difference in
interest rates between secured and unsecured loans increases with the probability of borrower
default (ρS), riskier ﬁrms have a stronger incentive to pledge trade credit as collateral. On the
other hand, ϑ and σSB lower the relative advantage of secured loans in ﬁnancing trade credit,
while κ reduces the relative return on sales. The inﬂuence of γ is twofold, but both effects go
in the same way, since γ lowers the funding costs for trade credit and increases its expected
return. On the contrary, τ and ρB have opposite effects on relative costs and returns and the
sign of the aggregate effect is undetermined.19
The solution given in equations (9) and (10) is based on the existence of: a) positive
disclosure costs for the buyer (κ > 0); b) an advantage for the seller in pledging trade credit
as collateral in terms of reducing the probability of default by the buyer (γ > 0). When either
of these conditions is not met, we obtain a corner solution: the share of trade credit pledged
as collateral is either zero or one (Table 1). In this framework, as long as ru
B <r s
TC,n ot r a d e
credit will be available and transactions will take place only on cash terms. When ru
B ≥ rs
TC
and ϑ < (ru
S − rs
S), there will only be cash terms as long as ru
B <r s
TC + ϑ; above this level,
suppliers will offer both cash terms and trade credit (two-part terms) and will use only bank
lending secured by accounts receivable (α =1 ). On the other hand, when ϑ > (ru
S − rs
S)
trade credit will be available only when it can be funded through unsecured bank borrowing
(α =0 ).
19 While τ reduces both relative costs and returns on trade credit ﬁnanced by secured loans, ρB increases
them.18
Table 1
SOLUTIONS FOR κ = γ = 0
Condition Condition Condition Trade α
1 2 3 Credit
ru
B <r s
TC - - no -
ru
B ≥ rs




TC + ϑ no -
id. id. ru
B ≥ rs
TC + ϑ yes 1









In this section I empirically test the theoretical results described in the preceding section,
byanalyzingtheuseoftradecreditas collateralinalargesampleofItalianﬁrms. Theobjective
is to estimate the model described by equations (9) and (10), where the dependent variable is
the share of accounts receivable pledged as collateral for bank borrowing.
I am aware of only two empirical studies on the use of trade credit as collateral: Berger
and Udell (1995) and Klapper (2001).20 Both studies use logit regressions to estimate the
probability that a ﬁrm has an outstanding line of credit secured by accounts receivable and use
samples of around 850 US ﬁrms.21 The characteristics of the sample ﬁrms, however, differ
sharply: while Klapper (2001) uses a sample of publicly traded companies, Berger and Udell
(1995) use data on small ﬁrms. Both papers ﬁnd evidence that lines of credit secured by
accounts receivable are used by riskier borrowers. On the other hand, while Klapper (2001)
shows that larger ﬁrms have a lower probability of pledging trade credit as collateral, the
20 Berger andUdell (1995)analyze varioustypesofcollateral separately, whileother studies, suchas Harhoff
and Korting (1998) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998; 2000), do not distinguish between accounts receivable and
other forms of collateral or guarantees. As we have seen, this distinction is crucial for two reasons: i) accounts
receivable represent “inside” collateral; ii) the decision to pledge accounts receivable may be based on different
motives than the decision to pledge other forms of collateral.
21 In the study by Berger and Udell (1995) collateral also includes inventories.19
opposite is true for Berger and Udell (1995). The latter study, moreover, ﬁnds evidence that
lines of credit secured by accounts receivable are more often used by younger ﬁrms and by
ﬁrms with shorter bank relationships.
Compared with the aforementioned empirical studies, in this paper I can exploit: a)a
much larger and more diversiﬁed sample of ﬁrms; b) a unique bank-ﬁrm matched database
containing individual information on loans and interest rates by borrower and lending bank, as
well as balance-sheet information on borrowing ﬁrms (including a measure of ﬁrms’ default
risk).
4.1 Description of the data and variables
The data used in the empirical analysis are taken from two main sources: the Central
Credit Register (Centrale dei Rischi) and the Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei
Bilanci). The ﬁrst source contains information on loans and interest rates by borrower and
lending bank; credits are reported by all Italian banks when the amount is above a threshold of
75,000 euros; interest rates are reported by a sample of around 70 banks (which includes the
main banks at national level). The second source contains balance sheet information on a large
number of ﬁrms. I merged information from these two sources for the year 2000, restricting
the ﬁeld of analysis to manufacturing ﬁrms. After controlling for problems of data quality,
I obtain a sample of almost 7,250 ﬁrms. Table 2 shows the distribution of sample ﬁrms by
region, size and industry.
Data on ‘matched loans’ from the Central Credit Register are used to approximate
the amount of ﬁrms’ borrowing secured by accounts receivable. ‘Matched loans’ is the
classiﬁcation used by the Central Credit Register for credit transactions with a form of
predetermined redemption, the majority of which are loans granted to make receivables
from third parties immediately available to bank customers. Data on the total amount of
ﬁrms’ receivables are taken instead from balance-sheet information collected by the Company
Accounts Data Service. As a consequence, for each ﬁrm the dependent variable (alfa)i s
deﬁned as the ratio between the amount of credit actually used in the category ‘matched loans’
and the total amount of accounts receivable (deﬁnitions of variables are summarized in Table
3).20
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of alfa for sample ﬁrms. As can be seen,
18 percent of sample ﬁrms do not use trade credit as collateral at all or only to a very
limited extent (less than 10 percent of their accounts receivable). About a third of sample
ﬁrms, on the contrary, pledge at least 50 percent of their accounts receivable. There are
419 observations (5.8 per cent of the sample) in which the dependent variable is greater than
unity. I chose to retain these observations in order to avoid problems of sample selection
bias, although I checked whether the econometric results were inﬂuenced by their inclusion.
Measurement errors can arise from using different sources of information (with different
reporting requirements). Furthermore, banks often extend lines of credit that can be used
either as ‘matched loans’ or as overdrafts (‘revocable loans’ in the classiﬁcation of the Central
Credit Register) and classify them according to their prevailing use.
The distribution of alfa has an important bearing on the empirical relevance of the
model described by equations (9) and (10). The model refers to the case in which κ and γ are
strictly positive. On the contrary, when they are equal to zero we should observe a bimodal
distribution around the values of zero and one. As can be seen from ﬁgure 1, the distribution
of alfa strongly rejects this hypothesis.
As shown in equation (9), the amount of trade credit the seller is willing to pledge
as collateral depends on: a) his own probability of default; b) the probability of default of
his customers; c) the covariance between these two probabilities; d) the advantage of the
seller over the bank in investigating the buyer’s creditworthiness, as well as in monitoring
and enforcing repayment of the credit; e) the costs for the seller of information disclosure
associated with pledging trade credit as collateral.
The credit risk of individual borrowers (rhos) is approximated by the difference between
the interest rate on unsecured overdraft facilities (‘revocable loans’) and a risk-free reference







22 In doing so, I follow the seminal study by Berger and Udell (1990), which empirically analyzes the risk-
collateral relationship. As risk-free interest rate I used the average yield before tax for Italian Treasury Bills
(BOTs), which was equal to 4.5 per cent in the year 2000.21
Empirically, this can be seen as an imperfect measure of credit risk for three reasons.23 First of
all, interest rates can be inﬂuenced by factors other than borrower creditworthiness. Moreover,
lending rates reported to the Central Credit Register also include commissions and fees.
Finally, in the theoretical analysis, for the sake of simplicity, all agents are supposed to be
risk-neutral. In case of risk aversion, of course, the interest rate would contain an additional
factor such as risk premium and expression (11) would overestimate the probability of default
by the borrower. These problems notwithstanding, I believe that this is the most direct and
reasonable measure of credit risk as perceived by the banks. Anyway, to check the robustness
of the results, as an alternative proxy for borrower quality I use credit scores provided by the
Company Accounts Data Service, which serve as predictors of insolvency.24
In order to extract from interest rates information on the probability of default by
customers(rhob)andonitscovariancewiththeprobabilityofdefaultbytheborrower(sigma),
















j β1jDijxi + ui, (13)
where yi is the left-hand side of expression (12), Dij are dummy variables, and xi is the
i n v e r s eo fo u rm e a s u r eo fρS, given by expression (11).25 In this way I obtain estimates
of ρ∗
B = ρB(1 − τ − γ) and σSB for 52 sub-groups of ﬁrms deﬁned as the intersection of
4 regions and 13 industries. These, of course, are very rough estimates of the underlying
variables. Problems arising in estimating the probability of default of borrowers from interest
rates are obviously magniﬁed in this case. Once again, however, these estimates can at least
23 See Harhoff and Korting (1998) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) for detailed criticism.
24 Credit scores are computed by the Company Account Data Service using discriminant analysis according
to the methodology described in Altman (1968) and Altman, Marco and Varetto (1994). They measure ﬁrms’
default risk and take values from 1 (‘high security’) to 9 (‘very high risk’). I merge the upper two classes because
of paucity of observations. Elsas and Krahnen (2000) use the bank’s internal borrower ratings as a proxy for
expected default risk.
25 Regression results are not shown. R2 is equal to 0.5. As can be seen from Table 4, the average probability
of default by customers (18.1 per cent) is much higher than for sellers (4.3 per cent). On average, the estimated
default correlation is 6.5 per cent.22
represent an ordinal approximation to the reference variables. Even if we express α∗ in terms
of ρ∗
B = ρB(1 − τ − γ), the sign of ∂α∗/∂ρ∗
B is undeﬁned and its value is lower (more
negative) for riskier sellers; on the other hand, in this case ∂α∗/∂τ should always be positive
and its value is decreasing with the seller’s probability of default (see Appendix for details).
As a proxy for the ﬁnancing advantage of the seller over the bank in terms of screening,
monitoring and enforcement, I use a measure of local judicial inefﬁciency. As Burkart and
Ellingsen (2004) state, ‘[w]ith perfect legal protection of creditors, trade credit loses its edge,
because itbecomesasdifﬁculttodivertcashasto divert inputs. Moregenerally, theimportance
of trade credit compared to bank credit should be greater when creditor protection is weaker’.
Compared with bank lending, trade credit is closer to a pure relationship-based system, where
‘parties intent on maintaining their ‘reputation’ honour the spirit of the agreement (often
in the absence of any written contract) in order to ensure a steady ﬂow of future business
within the same network of ﬁrms’ (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). As a consequence, the relative
advantage of trade credit over bank lending should be greater in environments where the legal
enforcement of contracts is less efﬁcient.26 As a measure of local judicial inefﬁciency, I use
the ratio of the average number of civil proceedings pending in the local court district to the
number of proceedings settled in every year (judinef).27
In the preceding theoretical discussion, information disclosure costs play a crucial role
in determining how much trade credit the ﬁrm is willing to pledge as collateral. Since the
dispersion of information among a large number of banks can be seen as a means of reducing
disclosure costs, the easiest way to test this hypothesis is by focusing on the characteristics of
the relationship between banks and borrowers. Two alternative proxies are used: the number
of banks that extend to the ﬁrm a line of credit secured by accounts receivable (numban), and
the share of the main bank (firstbank). What we expect is a negative association between the
intensity of bank-borrower relationships and the share of trade credit pledged as collateral. It
is worth noting that, in general, theoretical models predict a positive correlation between the
extent of collateralization and relationship intensity for inside collateral, and the opposite for
26 See Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) for empirical evidence that ﬁrms are more likely to rely on
trade credit in countries where legal institutions are less efﬁcient.
27 Data are averages over the period 1995-1998; local court districts are 164. I wish to thank Amanda
Carmignani for kindly providing me with her data; for details, see Carmignani (2004).23
outside collateral.28 Since accounts receivable are a typical form of inside collateral, this test
should be biased against the hypothesis maintained.
Another way to test the same hypothesis is by selecting ﬁrms which are less exposed
to the costs associated with information disclosure. Following Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia
(2003), in this case I use the share of ﬁxed physical assets on ﬁrm’s total assets (tangib),
which can be seen as a proxy of ﬁrm transparency. The intuition is that costs associated with
the disclosure of information on commercial and ﬁnancial relations with customers will be
lower for ﬁrms whose assets are mostly made up of tangibles. The share of physical capital,
however, can also inﬂuence our dependent variable in the opposite direction. A higher share of
tangible assets reduces information asymmetries between the bank and the borrower, because
it makes easier for the bank to observe the ‘quality’ of the prospective borrower, to monitor
his actions and to enforce repayment. As a consequence, it should also reduce the need for
the borrower to use accounts receivable as collateral. Once again, therefore, ﬁnding a positive
effect of the share of tangibles on the fraction of accounts receivable pledged as collateral
should be seen as a stronger test of the information disclosure hypothesis.
Additional variables are included in the econometric analysis to control for other factors
of heterogeneity across ﬁrms: age, size, industry, region, and business group afﬁliation. In the
literature on ﬁnancial intermediation it is usually assumed that information asymmetries are
less severe for larger and older ﬁrms, which as a result should be less ﬁnancially constrained
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Beck et al., 2004). Larger and older ﬁrms
should be less exposed to information asymmetry problems also regarding the quality of their
products and therefore they should need to resort less to trade credit as an implicit guarantee
(Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long Malitz and Ravid, 1993). In both cases, it should be easier for
larger and older ﬁrms to avoid theinformation disclosure associated with theuse oftrade credit
as collateral. The same should be true for ﬁrms that belong to corporate groups.
Finally, before turning to the econometric analysis, it may be useful to check empirically
one of the core elements underlying the model described by equations (9) and (10): the
prediction that the difference in interest rates between unsecured and secured lending increases
28 For the ﬁrst case, see Longhofer and Santos (2000) and Welch (1997); for the latter case, see Boot and
Thakor (1994).24
as the probability of default by the borrower rises. This is clearly the case, as can be seen
simply by plotting the two variables (Figure 2).29
4.2 Econometric results
To test the predictions put forward by Proposition 3, I estimate a Tobit model of the
following form, which can be seen as a ﬁrst-order linear approximation to the model described
by equations (9) and (10):30
alfa = β0 + β1rhos+ β2numban{β3firstbank} + β4tangib









{β11rhob + β12sigma} + ε, (14)
where Si, Rj, Ik are dummy variables for size, region and industry. All independent variables
(except dummies) are in log and have been standardized around the mean. The deﬁnition of
variables is reported in Table 3, while Table 4 shows summary statistics.
Tobitregression resultsarereportedinTable5. Observations withthedependent variable
equal to zero are obviously considered left-censored, while observations in which the line of
credit is fully used are taken as right-censored.31 Standard errors are adjusted for clustering of
observations in order to control for the bias arising in the estimation of the effects of aggregate
variables (such as judinef,rhoband sigma) on individual outcome (Moulton, 1990).
Due to the fact that variables rhob and sigma are not estimated for individual
observations but for groups of ﬁrms deﬁned by region and industry, rhoband sigma cannot be
included together with these dummy variables. Regression results obtained including region
andindustrydummies(andnotincludingrhobandsigma)arereportedintheﬁrsttwocolumns
of Table 5, while in the other two columns dummy variables are dropped and rhob and sigma
are included. In all these regressions the number of banks (numban) is used as a proxy for the
29 The ratio between the difference in interest rates and the probability of default by the borrower has an
upper limit equal to 1+R
1−ρS,f o rρB(1 − τ − γ) and σSB equal to zero, and becomes lower as ρB(1 − τ − γ) and
σSB increase. This explains the shape of the scatter diagram.
30 Alternative speciﬁcations are shown in brackets.
31 In this case the share of accounts receivable pledged as collateral is actually constrained by the amount of
credit granted by the bank. As a consequence, we do not observe the actual share of trade credit the ﬁrm would
be willing to use as collateral.25
intensity of bank-borrower relationships. As shown before, the predicted effects of judinef
and rhob are not determined, but we have testable predictions concerning how they should
change with the insolvency risk of the seller. As a consequence, in column (2) I also introduce
the interaction between judinef and a dummy variable equal to 1 when the insolvency risk
of the seller is below the median, while in column (4) I introduce the interactions of rhob and
judinef with a dummy variable equal to 1 when the insolvency risk of the seller is above the
median.
Empirical results are strongly in line with theoretical predictions. First of all, in all
speciﬁcations the share of trade credit pledged as collateral is signiﬁcantly higher for riskier
ﬁrms. Moreover, larger and older ﬁrms make less use of trade credit as collateral, even
after controlling for credit risk; the same is true for ﬁrms which belong to corporate groups.
The share of receivables pledged as collateral is larger when the intensity of the relationship
between the ﬁrm and the bank is lower and when ﬁrm’s assets are mostly made up of
tangibles. This gives support to the hypothesis that ﬁrms try to avoid disclosing information
on their commercial and ﬁnancial relations with customers, and that they do so the more this
information is valuable. As predicted, when the legal protection of creditors is weaker (and
the informal instruments of enforcement give suppliers a relatively greater advantage over
banks), the share of accounts receivable used to obtain bank credit is larger. Also as predicted,
this effect is weaker for low-risk suppliers (column 2). Finally, when measures of customers’
riskiness and covariance of insolvency between buyers and sellers are included, both variables
have a negative effect and are highly signiﬁcant (column 3).32 Furthermore, the interactions of
rhob and judinef with the dummy variable for high-risk suppliers have a negative effect as
predicted (column 4).
As a preliminary robustness check, the same regressions as in Table 5 are re-run by
using the share of the ﬁrst bank (instead of the number of banks) as a proxy for the intensity
of bank-borrower relationships. Econometric results hardly change at all (see Table 6) .
Severalotherrobustnesschecksarealsoperformed, andtheir resultsarereportedinTable
7. Firstly, since Tobit models are highly sensitive to the assumptions about the distribution of
the error term and since the share of censored observations is relatively small in our sample (7
32 Standard errors in the table do not take into account that rhob and sigma are estimated. However the two
variables would remain signiﬁcant even if adjusted standard errors were twice as large as reported.26
per cent of the total), the model is re-estimated by ordinary least squares in order to check that
previous results were not overly inﬂuenced by the estimation method. OLS results reported
in column (1) strongly reject this hypothesis. In column (2) we return to the Tobit regression,
in this case treating as right-censored all the observations in which the ratio between facilities
used and granted is over 0.80. The underlying hypothesis is that ﬁrms could be ﬁnancially
constrained even before exhausting the full amount of the line of credit. Econometric results
do not change signiﬁcantly. The same holds true for regression (3), in which observations with
the dependent variable greater than unity are also dropped.
The last robustness checks concern the measure of borrowers’ default risk. In this case I
substitute the proxy extracted from interest rates with credit scores provided by the Company
Accounts Data Service. Due to unavailability of data, the sample size falls by almost one third
(distribution of ﬁrms by score are reported in Table 9). For comparison, in column (4) I report
the results obtained by re-running my benchmark regression on this reduced sample. As can
be seen, estimates do not change with sample selection. Table 8 shows the results obtained by
using credit scores as a proxy for the probability of insolvency of the borrowers.33 They are
generally unaffected.34 Above all, it is clearly conﬁrmed that the share of trade credit used as
collateral grows monotonically with the insolvency risk of the borrower.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper I model the incentives for a ﬁrm to post accounts receivable as collateral as
a trade-off between the beneﬁts stemming from lower interest rates and the costs arising from
the disclosure of information associated with this form of collateral. Since the difference in
interest rates between unsecured and secured lending increases with the borrower’s probability
of default, riskier ﬁrms have a stronger incentive to pledge trade credit as collateral. On the
other hand, ﬁrms which are more exposed to the costs associated with information disclosure
(such as ﬁrms with few bank relationships and a high level of intangible assets) have stronger
incentives to avoid this form of secured borrowing. These predictions are supported by
empirical evidence on the collateralization of receivables in a large sample of Italian ﬁrms.
33 In these regressions, as in column (3) of Table 7, I drop observations with the dependent variable greater
than unity and consider right-censored observations in which the ratio between facilities used and granted is over
0.80.
34 The only difference concerns the ﬁr m ’ sa g e ,w h i c hi nt h i ss p e c i ﬁcation turns out to be insigniﬁcant (and
positive).27
Since setting up a ﬁnance subsidiary is a possible alternative to avoid disclosing information
to third parties, the model can also shed some light on the decision by large ﬁrms to establish
captive factors.35 In their study of accounts receivable management policies, Mian and Smith
(1992)shows thatsmallerandriskierﬁrms issueaccounts-receivablesecureddebt, whilelarger
and more creditworthy ﬁrms establish captive ﬁnance subsidiaries.
The paper focuses on costs and beneﬁts for the ﬁrm of using accounts receivable as
collateral. In doing so, it obviously disregards other relevant aspects. In the model, for
example, the bank is supposed to know the default risk of both the borrowing ﬁrm and
its customer. Hence problems stemming from asymmetric information and moral hazard
are ruled out. Possible extensions of the model should also consider: a) the informational
advantage for the bank of having receivables as collateral (Mester, Nakamura and Renault,
2002);36 b) the monitoring costs for the bank to exploit such information (Rajan and Winton,
1995; Klapper, 2001); c) moral hazard problems (Frank and Maksimovic, 1998; Burkart and
Ellingsen, 2004).37 The inclusion of these elements in a more complex model remains a topic
for future research.
35 In Italy, the second largest market in the world for factoring turnover in 2003, captive industrial factors
have a market share of about one third and are specialized in factoring both receivables and payables of parent
companies (Benvenuti and Gallo, 2004). As far as accounts payable of parent companies are concerned, this
is made easier by the legal right of the debtor to prevent the transfer of his debt to third parties without his
agreement.
36 This would imply, for example, that a larger number of bank relationships should lower both information
disclosure costs for the borrower and the informational advantage for the lender.
37 If the bank cannot directly observe the ﬁnancial worthiness of the buyers that are being offered trade
credit, concerns about the seller’s credit policy could restrict the amount of secured lending the bank is willing to
extend. In this case, long-term bank relationships could mitigate the problem, as in an inﬁnitely repeated moral
hazard game.Tables and Figures
Table 2
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FIRMS BY REGION, SIZE AND INDUSTRY
Code Item No. of Firms %
Region
NW North-West 3,126 43.1
NE North-East 2,516 34.7
CE Centre 1,127 15.6
S&I South & islands 479 6.6
Size
1 Less than 100 employees 4,861 67.1
2 100-199 employees 1,368 18.9
3 200-499 employees 755 10.4
4 Over 499 employees 264 3.6
Industry
DA Food, beverages & tobacco 782 10.8
DB Textiles & clothing 1,010 13.9
DC Leather & footwear 348 4.8
DD Wood products 158 2.2
DE Paper & printing 386 5.3
DG Chemical products 436 6.0
DH Rubber & plastic materials 442 6.1
DI Non-metallic mineral products 418 5.8
DJ Metals & metal products 1,103 15.2
DK Machinery & equipment 983 13.6
DL Electrical & optical apparatus 553 7.6
DM Trasport equipment 201 2.8
DN Other manufacturing 428 5.9




Ratio of ﬁrm’s bank debt secured by accounts receivable (ARs)
to ﬁrm’s total ARs
Rhos Ln (seller’s probability of default)
Rhob Ln (customers’ probability of default)
Sigma Ln (covariance in insolvency between sellers and customers)
Numban
Ln (number of banks with which the seller
has a credit line secured by ARs)
Firstbank
Ln (share of the ﬁrst bank with which the seller
has a credit line secured by ARs)
Tangib Ln (1 + ratio of tangible assets to total assets)
Judinef
Ln (ratio of pending trials to yearly trials deﬁned
in the local court districts)
Age Ln (1 + ﬁrm’s age in years)
Group
Dummy variable: 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to a corporate group,
0o t h e r w i s eTable 4
SAMPLE STATISTICS
(original values)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Alfa 7,248 0.4177 0.3432 0.0000 2.2033
Rhos 7,248 0.0432 0.0239 0.0006 0.1500
Rhob 7,248 0.1807 0.0494 0.0855 0.3870
Sigma 7,248 0.0051 0.0013 0.0012 0.0073
Numban 7,248 7.6500 4.0345 1.0000 42.0000
Firstbank 7,248 0.3288 0.1791 0.0669 1.0000
Tangib 7,248 0.2071 0.1397 0.0000 0.7966
Judinef 7,248 3.0439 1.1847 0.8071 21.0592
Age 7,248 24.0820 15.5374 0.0000 100.0000
Group 7,248 0.2986 0.4577 0.0000 1.0000Table 5
DETERMINANTS OF THE SHARE OF TRADE CREDIT
PLEDGED AS COLLATERAL
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4)



























































Judinef (Low Rhos) −0.018
(0.005)
∗∗∗















































Regional dummies yes yes no no










Log likelihhod −2,441 −2,435 −2,533 −2,521
Wald χ2 1,943 (24) 1,987 (25) 1,091 (11) 1,566 (13)
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations: 7,248 (6,739 uncensored; 240 left-censored; 269 right-censored)
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets under the coefﬁcient. In columns (1) and (2) standard errors are adjusted for
clustering in local court districts, in columns (3) and (4) for clustering in region and industry groups. In addition to the
variables reported, where indicated the regression also includes 3 regional dummies and 12 industry dummies. In these cases,
stars indicate the results of joint signiﬁcance tests.∗∗∗
Signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. ∗∗
5p e rc e n t .∗
10 per cent.Table 6
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS:
FIRSTBANK USED INSTEAD OF NUMBAN
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4)



























































Judinef (Low Rhos) −0.020
(0.005)
∗∗∗














































Regional dummies yes yes no no










Log likelihhod −2,587 −2,580 −2,680 −2,667
Wald χ2 1,631 (24) 1,634 (25) 961 (11) 1,223 (13)
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations: 7,248 (6,739 uncensored; 240 left-censored; 269 right-censored)
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets under the coefﬁcient. In columns (1) and (2) standard errors are adjusted for
clustering in local court districts, in columns (3) and (4) for clustering in region and industry groups. In addition to the
variables reported, where indicated the regression also includes 3 regional dummies and 12 industry dummies. In these cases,
stars indicate the results of joint signiﬁcance tests.∗∗∗
Signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. ∗∗
5 per cent. ∗
10 per cent.Table 7
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4)




































































































Regional dummies yes ∗ yes yes yes ∗∗








R2/Log likelihood 0.2019 −3,462 −1,598 −1,654
F/W a l dχ2 92.8 (25, 149) 1,479 (25) 1,741 (25) 2,074 (25)
Prob> F/χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations: 7,248 7,248 6,829 4,981
uncensored − 5,842 5,588 4,648
left-censored − 240 240 170
right-censored − 1,166 1,001 163
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering of observations in local court districts, are reported in brackets under the coefﬁcient.
In addition to the variables reported, where indicated the regression also includes 3 regional dummies and 12 industry dummies. In
these cases stars indicate the results of joint signiﬁcance tests. ∗∗∗
Signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. ∗∗
5 per cent. ∗
10 per cent.Table 8
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS:
CREDIT SCORES USED INSTEAD OF RHOS
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4)










































































































Judinef (Low Rhos) −0.025
(0.004)
∗∗∗















































Regional dummies yes yes yes no
Industry dummies yes ∗∗∗ yes ∗∗∗ yes ∗∗∗ no
(continues)(Table 8 continued)










Log likelihhod −614 −593 −613 −688
Wald χ2 4,783 (30) 4,897 (31) 4,670 (31) 2,807 (17)
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations: 4,679 (3,845 uncensored; 170 left-censored; 664 right-censored)
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering of observations, are reported in brackets under the coefﬁcient.
Where indicated the regression also includes 3 regional dummies and 12 industry dummies. In these cases stars indicate the results
of joint signiﬁcance tests. ∗∗∗
Signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. ∗∗
5 per cent level. ∗
10 per cent level.Table 9
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FIRMS BY CREDIT SCORES
Code Score No. of Firms %
1 High security 70 1.4
2 Security 208 4.2
3 High solvency 366 7.4
4 Solvency 1,355 27.2
5 Vulnerability 1,020 20.5
6 High vulnerability 853 17.1
7 Risk 1,027 20.6
8 H i g h&v e r yh i g hr i s k 82 1.7
Total 4,981 100.0Figure 1
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rhosAppendix
Proof of Proposition 2
When unsecured bank borrowing is used to ﬁnance accounts receivable, for trade credit
to be at least as convenient as direct bank lending (ru
TC ≤ ru
B), we must have:
τ ≥
ρS (1 − ρB)
ρB (1 − ρS)
.
For ρS = ρB, τ should be ≥ 1, which is impossible by deﬁnition.
When accounts receivable are pledged as collateral for bank borrowing, for trade credit
to be at least as convenient as direct bank lending (rs
TC ≤ ru
B), we must have:
σSB ≤ 1 − ρSρB (1 − τ − γ) −
(1 − ρB)
1 − ρB (1 − τ − γ)
.





ρB (τ + γ) − σSB (1 − ρB (1 − τ − γ))
ρB (1 − τ − γ)(1− ρB (1 − τ − γ))
.
In terms of the ratio of σSB to its upper bound (σ∗










(1 − τ − γ)[1− ρB (1 − τ − γ)]
 
.
Example Suppose (τ +γ)=0 .2 and ρB =0 .01. In this case trade credit is viable for a seller
who is riskier than the buyer if the covariance is less than 24.4 per cent of its upper bound.39
When the covariance is 20 per cent of its maximum, a supplier with a probability of default of
6.5 per cent can offer trade credit to a client with a probability of default of 1 per cent at the
same interest rate as the bank. With a risk-free interest rate equal to 4 per cent, this means that
a ﬁrm that borrows from a bank at an interest rate of 11.2 per cent (on an unsecured basis) can
make trade credit to a ﬁrm that pays an interest rate of 5.1 per cent.
38 For ρS > ρB, σ∗
SB = ρB (1 − τ − γ)(1− ρS).
39 This means that the seller will default in less than 24.4 per cent of the cases in which the buyer defaults.40
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3







(1−ρSρB(1−τ−γ)−σSB)2ρB (1 − τ − γ)
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The sign will be positive for low levels of κ.












If we express α in terms of ρ∗
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(for R and ρB → 0).


































Since α ≤ 1, the derivative will always be positive for
κ <
ρS (1 + R)





which is always true for κ ≤ 1.

















T h es i g nw i l lb en e g a t i v ef o r :
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If we express α in terms of ρ∗
B = ρB (1 − τ − γ), the sign of ∂α
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B will be negative for:42
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